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KANT, INFINITY AND HIS FIRST ANTINOMY 
JAMES WILLIAM LINCOLN 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Kant’s antinomies skillfully juxtapose two arguments which expose the dangerous 
propensity for human reasoning to stretch beyond the conditioned and into the 
transcendental ideas of the unconditional. Kant believes this is a natural process and 
affirms the limits of pure reason in so much as they should prevent us from believing that 
we can truly know anything about the unconditional. His first antinomy addresses the 
possibility that a belief in a beginning in time or that a belief in no beginning in time is 
dubious at best. This thesis will focus on this first antinomy and critically assesses it in 
set theoretic terms. It is this author’s belief that the mathematical nuances of infinite sets 
and the understanding of mathematical objects bear relevance to the proper interpretation 
of this antinomy. Ultimately, I will argue that Kant’s argument in the first antinomy is 
flawed because it fails to account for infinite bounded sets and a conceptualization of the 
infinite as a mathematical object_of_reason.  
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Section 1 - Introduction  
Kant’s chapter on the antinomies serves two purposes1. The first is intended to 
illustrate the problematic nature of transcendental ideas. Secondly, they serve as a 
secondary proof for time as a form of perception. This manuscript is exclusively 
concerned with them in the former sense and thus as road signs for reason. Kant denies 
the objective reality of cosmological ideas by strategically showing that reason 
contradicts itself when it considers them
2
. These types of ideas are cosmological concepts 
which describe unconditioned ideas and are identified with what presents an ultimate 
explanation for some idea
3
. They are unconditioned totalities that don’t depend on some 
instance of an idea
4
. Kant describes human reasoning as possessing the propensity to 
move from the conditioned to the unconditioned within the framework that “if the 
conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolutely 
unconditioned is also given”5. This synthetic process means that we move from an 
instance of an idea to an encompassing totality of that. Kant believes this is a natural 
process which creates transcendental ideas; ones which transcend experience towards the 
unconditional ideas of reason
6
.  He sees this as a blatant transgression to the limits of 
experience and thus believes that reason’s employment should thereby be limited to 
things a posteriori
7
.  
                                                     
 
1 Gardner p. 234 - 235 
2 Gardner p. 234 - 235 
3 Gardner p. 216-217 
4 Gardner p. 217 
5 Gardner p. 218 
6 Gardner p. 217 
7 Gardner p. 218-219 
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He suggests that the antinomies, as a whole, embody this truth. The cosmological 
ideas are “categories extended to the unconditioned” and his categories “are not fitted to 
such employment
8.” The logical contradiction that arises out of the antinomies, in Kant’s 
view, supports this claim. In this paper, I shall focus on Kant’s first instance of the 
“antinomical” project and its conclusions about time. His arguments for and against the 
possibility of a beginning in time seem, to me, the most unsettling part of the antinomies. 
What is disconcerting is not Kant’s final suggestion, namely that we cannot empirically 
know transcendental ideas, but rather the fact that his conception and methodological use 
of infinity is dubious from a mathematical perspective. We should question the apparent 
contradiction generated by the opposition of his thesis and antithesis. Specifically, this 
should cause us to doubt the mechanics used to formulate his first antinomy and by 
extension should reinvest our faculties in an effort to investigate the possibility that the 
concept of infinity can be accessed; even if only in as a mathematical object. This is 
because his thesis and antithesis concerning time turn on mathematical hinges.  
From this pivot point, any argumentative flaw should preclude our ability to 
accept Kant’s conclusion because any misapplication of infinity in his thesis or antithesis 
compromises his conclusion. I believe that the concepts of “infinity” and “series” are 
pivotal components to Kant’s discussion of time. This is, of course, not unintentional. 
Kant divides the antinomies into two types, the mathematical and dynamical, the first two 
being mathematical, while the later are classified are dynamical
9
. His exploration of time, 
                                                     
 
8 Kant (2007) p. 386 
9 Gardner p. 234 - 235 
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as a part of the first antinomy, focuses on our conception of time in the past as a series of 
moments. Thus, a mathematical investigation of his work is more than appropriate 
because of its relationship to mathematical concepts like infinity and the series whether 
they be conceived in Kant or more contemporary thinkers. Apropos of that, this piece will 
elucidate ideas about series, the finite and the infinite in a mathematical and Kantian 
framework. Along the way I will highlight several papers on this very subject and show, 
that, given a proper mathematical conception of the infinite, we must accept that Kant’s 
thesis and antithesis describe traversing of an infinite number of moments in both cases. 
This, however, allows for the possibility for a reasonable conception of the past as 
infinite without Kant’s proclaimed contradiction for reason and, in the mathematical 
sense, allows us to access the infinite though mathematical reasoning. From this, we can 
gain access to the experience of the infinite as only a finite being can. Namely, as a 
recursive definition which can encapsulate potential infinitely as a mathematical object of 
reason. This object represents an understanding of infinity as a method.  
It is prudent, however, to begin with a short sketch of Kant’s antinomy about time. 
His thesis is an argument with four premises which purports us to conclude that there is a 
beginning in time. His antithesis is an argument consisting of five premises which lead to 
the conclusion that there is no beginning in time. Stated succinctly: 
Time has a Beginning (Thesis) Time has no Beginning (Antithesis) 
PT1) Time has no beginning 
PT2) If time has no beginning then up to every 
moment an eternity has elapsed, namely an 
infinite series has been completed. 
PA1) Time has a beginning 
PA2) If something has a beginning then there 
was a time preceding it when it was “not.” 
PA3) There must have been a preceding time 
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when everything was “not.” 
PT3) A series is completed through successive 
synthesis 
PT4) It is impossible for this infinite series to 
have passed, i.e. it is impossible to 
complete an infinite successive synthesis 
PA4) If everything is “not” then no coming to 
be is possible.  
PA5) If no coming to be is possible then there is 
no ability to start a series of time which 
leads to this moment.  
CT) Therefore, our assumption must be false 
and time must have a beginning. 
CA) Therefore, our assumption must be false 
and time must have no beginning. 
Table 1: Outline of Kant’s First Antinomy
10 
Ultimately, Kant affirms that a conception of the infinitude or finitude of time 
which quantify the ontological status of a beginning or non-beginning of time, as 
unconditioned ideas, must be inaccessible to experience because pure reason pushes 
beyond what we can know a posteriori in the search for the unconditioned
11
. Its non-
experiential character results from the fact that the infinitude or finitude of time can only 
be derived by reason. As Kant would say, the “unconditioned is never to be met within 
experience, but only in the idea”12. 
 From this, Kant concludes that reason’s treatment of transcendental ideas creates 
an unavoidable contradiction which is indicative of the search for absolute totality 
demanded by reason
13
. Furthermore, reasonable beings naturally ascend from a condition 
to the unconditional to consider whether the series does or does not cease
14
. Thus, we 
necessarily think of time as having completely elapsed to a given moment because 
absolute totality is demanded
15
. I believe that this conception of time formulates itself 
                                                     
 
10 Kant (2007) p. 396 - 397 
11 Kant (2007) p. 386 
12 Kant (2007) p. 386 [B436] 
13 Kant (2007) p. 387 [A410] 
14 Kant (2007) p. 387 [B437] 
15 Kant (2007) p. 387 [A410] 
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around the mechanics required to complete a series of moments and touches upon the 
ontology of the infinite.   
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Section 2- Kant’s conception of a series as the unconditioned 
 
Overall, I’m proposing that Kant’s time is consistent with contemporary 
mathematical terminology used to define a series. Kant’s time describes a formal 
condition for internal sense
16
. In this way, his perception of a series is formally 
conditioned by time
17
. We naturally think of time as a series of moments in succession. 
This is the dominant characteristic of time in Kant’s undertaking. It is one that, as 
Lawrence Friedman would say, conforms to the rules of a series thereby consisting “at 
least in part in the comparing or relating of the elements of the series” and that the 
convergence of Kant’s series of time persists as a “bringing together,” a successive 
synthesis, of that series to the present moment
18
. The moments of time in sequence are 
“coming together” to converge at the limit of the present moment and can’t do otherwise. 
Time, as a sequence of moments, can therefore be quantitatively analyzed. We will return 
to this notion soon, but I urge the reader to keep it in mind.  
In terms of a sequence, a series is “a function whose domain is either a natural 
number” or infinity, i.e. all the natural numbers19. The former constitutes a finite 
sequence and the later an infinite. To illustrate the mathematical conception of a series, 
consider the following examples. The set natural numbers, denoted N = {0, 1, 2, 3, …}, is 
a series, denoted N = <0, 1, 2, 3, …>. The former notation signifies the form of the 
natural numbers as a set and the latter as a series. The difference between the two is that, 
as a set, the group of natural numbers need not be ordered, while, in a series, its members 
                                                     
 
16 Friedman p. 381 
17 Kant (2007) p. 388  
18 Friedman p. 381 
19 Jech p. 46 
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become ordered in some particular sequence
20
. So when given set N we are well within 
the definition to denote it as N = { 2, 1, 3, 1000, …} even though it is not intuitively 
understood that it is the set of natural numbers. In terms of a series, if we change the 
order of its representation we structurally transform it into a new series. This means that 
<0, 1, 2, 3> is not identical to <2, 3, 1, 0>. In this regard, we rightly expect a series to be 
a kind of ordered set
21
.  
Ordered sets have been given a structure in some framework. They are reflexive, 
antisymmetric and transitive
22. In the context of the “less than or equal to relation", this 
means that:  
1. Each member is identical within the framework to itself. (Reflexivity: a ≤ a)23 
2. If “a” and “b” are members of an ordered set then if “a” stands in relation to “b” 
and “b” in relation to “a” that “a” and “b” are identical.  
(Antisymmetry: If a ≤ b and b ≤ a then a = b)24 
3. If “a,” “b” and “c” are members and if  “a” stands in relation to “b” and “b” in 
relation to “c” then “a” stands in relation to “c.” (Transitivity: If a ≤ b and b ≤ c 
then a ≤ c)25 
Strictly ordered sets, however, are neither reflexive nor antisymmetric. They are 
more rigid relations which are asymmetric and transitive. Thus under the “less than” 
relation, to be a strictly ordered set means: 
                                                     
 
20 Jech p. 1 & 46 
21 Jech p. 33 - 34 
22 Jech p. 34 
23 Jech p. 33 
24 Jech p. 33 
25 Jech p. 33 
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1. a < b and b < a are never both true (Asymmetry)26 
2. If “a,” “b” and “c” are members and if  “a” stands in relation to “b” and “b” in 
relation to “c” then “a” stands in relation to “c.” (Transitivity: If a < b and b < c 
then a < c)
27
 
 Kant’s conception of time, in my assessment, fits within the context of a strictly 
ordered set. The moment before now is described as such because it comes before and 
can’t come after or at the same time as this moment. This naturally describes asymmetry. 
Furthermore, the sequence of time describes a transitive set because any moment stands 
in rigid relation to other moments within the series. It is locked in its position along the 
sequence of moments. I am confident in affirming this relationship because Kant suggests 
that the past constitutes the present insomuch as the past is not present in itself but as a 
foundation for the possibility of my present experience
28
. Therefore, this strict 
relationship between past and present can only be correlated to a strictly ordered series.  
 To elaborate further, a strictly ordered series is grounded in its enumeration by the 
natural numbers. In abstract notation a series A can be of the form A = <a0, a1, a2, a3, …., 
an, an+1, …> where the subscript “n” is a member of the sequence of natural numbers
29
. It 
should be noted that finite series exists such that the sequence is limited by a finite 
natural number “n”. An infinite series is not restricted to this condition such that it will 
continue to “n+1”, “n+2” and so on.  
                                                     
 
26 Jech p. 33 
27 Jech p. 33 
28 Kant (2007) p. 442 [A495] 
29 Jech p. 34 
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 Given this overview of the mathematical characterization of the series, we can see 
that when Kant says reason demands an absolute totality is demanded is the absolute 
completeness of the conditions of a series’ possibility. Stated simply, reason is looking 
for an absolute complete synthesis of the series, i.e. a complete enumeration. The 
competed series, in this sense, is the unconditioned as we defined earlier
30
. However, the 
unconditioned for Kant can have two conceived notions in this series of moments
31
. In 
one sense it consists in the entire series and in another the absolute unconditioned is part 
of the series
32
. Either infinity is constituted in the totality of the series of moments or as a 
member of the series of moments.  
 In the former alternative, all members of the sequence are conditioned and only its 
totality is unconditioned
33
. This means that members of the series form conditioned 
instances of moments in time and that the totality of them is the infinitude of time’s 
completed series of moments. From this conception there is no end to the series, i.e. it is 
infinite, and for the past we see that the regressive enumeration is never ending. Kant 
does say that this regress is never completed and “can only be called potentially 
infinite
34.” To illustrate, consider the series S = <…. Sn+1, Sn, … S1, S0>. Its enumeration 
when “n” is a natural number is clearly the series of natural numbers, N = <…3, 2, 1, 0>. 
Therefore, the series S has no limit and it will never be completed as we count 
backwards. To speak in mathematically equivalent terms, I would suggest that this 
                                                     
 
30 Kant (2007) p. 391 [B444] 
31 Kant (2007) p. 391 
32 Kant (2007) p. 391 
33 Kant (2007) p. 391 [B445] 
34 Kant (2007) p. 392 [B446] 
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conception of the infinite fits within the boundaries of a countable set. An infinite series, 
as a type of set, is countable if the number of members a set has is equivalent to the set of 
all natural numbers or some finite number
35
. This means that the members of an infinite 
set can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the natural numbers while finite sets 
are put into a one-to-one correspondence with a finite number. When we mathematically 
analyze Kant’s unconditioned in the first sense we are creating an isomorphism between 
a series and the natural numbers. Consequently, the series is countable but inexhaustible 
and the unconditioned exists as a totality of the inexhaustible enumeration in accord with 
the natural numbers. It is the totality of the successive synthesis. 
 In the latter sense, the unconditioned is a part of the sequence with all other 
members as subordinate to it
36
. Under this conception, there exists a first member of the 
series, and, in terms of time, a beginning to the world
37
. In mathematical terms, this 
conception of the unconditioned can only be pictured as a bounded series with a 
beginning along at some earlier moment and an “end” at the present moment. What is 
unconditioned in this series is its beginning.  
 Clearly, the unconditioned in the first sense refers to the thesis and in the latter 
sense to the antithesis. It is here that the unsettling characteristic of Kant’s first antinomy 
emerges. On the one hand, Kant is suggesting that an actual infinite amount of time 
describes an unconditioned and that an infinite enumeration can only be potential
38
. On 
                                                     
 
35 Jech p. 74 
36 Kant (2007) p. 391 – 392 [A418] 
37 Kant (2007) p. 392 [B446] 
38 Kant (2007) p. 393 [A418] 
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the other hand, I believe that Kant assumes that the bounded set of a past with a 
beginning is a finite set because he believes a finite set can be completely enumerated in 
successive synthesis as a totality thus satisfying an absolute completeness of the 
conditions of their possibility
39
. Given the aforementioned mathematical conception of 
Kant’s unconditioned, I am forced to question his application of the infinite series 
because his antithesis seems compatible with the conception of an infinite bounded 
series.  
This, in my assessment, fatally undermines Kant’s enterprise. He assumes that the 
thesis describes an infinite series and the antithesis describes a finite series. The former is 
conceived as such because he believes it impossible to constitute the totality of an infinite 
past in such a way to constitute the present
40
. In terms of the latter, Kant believes that the 
describe series has termini which allows the comprehension of the totality of that series
41
. 
However, I believe it is possible that they both describe infinite series. This assertion 
rests on our understanding of an infinite series, the unconditioned and infinite bounded 
series. The following is intended to clarify these ideas.  
  
                                                     
 
39 Kant p. 390 [A416] 
40 Kant p. 396-397 
41 Kant p. 396-397 
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Section 3 - The Infinite Series and the Unconditioned 
 
 Defining an infinite set, and by extension an infinite series, is made possible by 
Georg Cantor’s work on the infinite. In his authoritative theory, an infinite set “is a class 
which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a part of itself”42. This means that 
you can take any set or series and find a subset with the same number of members as the 
whole set. Some who hold this view criticize Kant on the grounds that he confuses the 
infinite and the indefinite
43
.  However, I would suggest that, while Kant could not have 
access to Cantor’s work, we can see a conception of the infinite his Inaugural 
Dissertation which is consistent with it in so much as we are working the first transfinite 
number, namely omega as denoted by ω.  
Kant suggested that he sees, in the infinite, a measure to which “nothing is 
greater
44”. It is thus hard to see how Cantor’s conception of the infinite can bring about 
grounds for criticism because if a subset of itself is the same size as the original set there 
remains nothing greater in size than that set. The cardinality, the number of members 
within a set, is the same. Put in set theoretical terms, Kant’s conception is consistent with 
the mathematical convention that there exists an infinite subset of an enumerable set that 
is also enumerable
45
. To illustrate this, we should consider the series of natural numbers, 
N = <0, 1, 2, 3, ….>. An infinite subset of that series, say the even natural number  
N
2n
 = <2, 4, 6, 8, ….>, is also enumerable by the natural numbers. If a set is enumerable 
by a natural number it is defined as countable but if it is enumerable by all the natural 
                                                     
 
42 Fried p. 214 
43 Cobb p. 690 
44 Kant (2011) Location 592 
45 Jech p. 74 
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numbers it is infinitely countable
46
. This is reflected in the terminology used by Kant in 
his thesis because he specifically says that “up to every moment and eternity has 
elapsed
47.” This can be translated into strict mathematical terms to mean that a subset of 
the infinite series of the past can also be countably infinite.  
 In light of this, I think we should reassess what it means to traverse an infinite 
series. Kant’s conception of the past in his thesis, as a totality, is an actual infinity as 
opposed to the potential infinity of the future. Paul Carus, and others, might argue that it 
is presumptuous to take what we know in finite terms and push it to an infinite 
conception of the totality of things. Kant could be confusing a finite perception of time 
for an infinite if he tries to use it to experientially grasp an infinite series of moments in 
time. This could mean that he confuses the infinite with the indefinite and that he sees the 
indefinite as something we can’t experience; however, in my assessment he departs from 
that logic because I believe that he doesn’t try to move from a finite conception of an 
elapsed series to an infinite conception. Kant clearly intends his thesis to describe the 
infinite and his antithesis as finite. Because of this, he demonstrates that he understand 
the difference between the finite, the infinite and the indefinite. The problem of Kant’s 
traversable infinite series is not a problem of an “indefinite object” because infinity is a 
definite unconditioned idea for Kant.  
Instead, the critical problem is one of experience verses mathematical necessity. 
Josiah Royce would articulate this problem by saying that an intuition of the Kantian type 
                                                     
 
46 Jech p.74 
47 Kant (2007) p. 397 
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merely holds characteristics belonging to the human experience and that such finite 
experiences cannot leap into mathematical truisms about infinity even though both are 
definite objects of experience
48
. The infinite, is thus a topic of the unconditional suited 
exclusively to the mathematical discipline which deals with the consequences of infinity 
thus making it possible to subject them to exact treatment in relation to experience within 
reason
49
. And so, when we ask ourselves if it is possible to experience infinity we should 
be surprised when the answer I’m providing requires a mathematical paradigm which 
pulls a mathematical object into Kant’s manifold of intuition generating the concept 
clearly and distinctly.  
Furthermore, as I made clear earlier, Kant has walked away from experience and 
is dealing with ideas of pure reason. Royce’s response would suggest that we may only 
be capable of experiencing the infinite as a concept of mathematical necessity but it 
remains accessible as a mathematical recursive construction because “forms of thought 
are unquestionably the forms of mathematical science”50. A simple illustration of this 
idea is the possibility of a set of past experiences because we structure experience in 
terms of temporal sequences. Moreover, Kant believes “mathematical cognition has this 
particularity: it must first exhibit a concept in intuition, and do so a priori, in an intuition 
that is not empirical but pure
51.”  Furthermore, he says that “arithmetic attains it concepts 
of number by the successive addition of units in time
52” and therefore the form of Kant’s 
                                                     
 
48 Royce p. 200 
49 Royce p. 202 
50 Royce p. 206 
51 Kant (2001) p. 23 [281] 
52 Kant (2001) p. 29 
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time series gains meaning through the conception of enumeration because our intuition of 
time is enumerated by a successive addition of units in time. We thus “experience” the 
infinite as a method of enumeration and as a pure mathematical construction.  
 This is a powerful notion indeed. Carus, and others, argue that infinity is not an 
object in sensible terminology. However, I believe it makes sense to suggest that infinity 
is a mathematical object, consistent with the Kantian notion of time, and our execution of 
the inexhaustible enumeration of the infinite, through a recursive definition, is the 
“sensible” object which sustains the present moment. Mathematical recursive definitions 
can define the contents of Kant’s series. In terms of our past time set S = <…. Sn+1, Sn, … 
S1, S0>, where “n” is a member of the natural numbers, a recursive definition of Kant’s 
first antinomy would look something like this: 
Kant’s Thesis Kant’s Antithesis 
S0 = the current moment 
Sn+1 = the moment just before moment Sn  
S∞ = the unconditional idea of every moment that 
occurred before the present 
S0 = the current moment 
S1 = the moment just before moment S0  
Sn = the beginning of time 
Table 2: The First Antinomy in Recursive Form 
 
 This is a controversial suggestion but one, in my assessment, that is consistent 
with Kant’s notion of infinity. His thesis is contingent on the idea that the world today, as 
an end of a series, is impossible to reach because we can’t complete the series to this 
moment. However, a recursive definition allows us to know any point along the infinite 
regress of the series. When conceiving the past as an infinite regress, recall series S, we 
can define any moment from the present to the past as some enumerated member of that 
set S. In any way we conceive it, I can know the location of any moment in the past as a 
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definite moment as soon as I define it in correspondence with some “n”. The limit of this 
conception is an infinite number, known as a transfinite number and, in this case, the 
number ω, which is itself an inexhaustible limit. Transfinite numbers are those that are 
larger than all finite numbers
53
. This completion of a “limit” is intrinsically different from 
that found in Kant’s antithesis. By limit, I do not mean a beginning to the series. In the 
antithesis the limit of the regress is the beginning of time. As a mathematical conception, 
the conception of “limit” in Kant’s first antinomy suggests a process of the enumeration 
for each past moment. Stated otherwise, choosing a point in the past to define a series to 
the present moment as a subset of the whole part or, as Kant does, choosing the first 
member of the series if one exists.  
 However, by choosing a limit of the enumeration to be infinite we can be assured 
that it is supported by a recursive definition which describes the process of enumeration. 
Therefore, it is reasonably acceptable, in my assessment, to allow the recursive process to 
provide a foundation for the proposition that the past is infinite. Kant suggests that “an 
infinite given magnitude is impossible” and he may be sensibly right; however he fails to 
recognize that when he says “the successive synthesis of units required for the 
enumeration of a quantum can never be complete” 54 he allows us to construct a recursive 
definition of the successive synthesis of that past. This serves as a mathematical model 
for the infinite object of our past as an unconditional idea. Furthermore, as we will 
discuss shortly, this simultaneously applies to the thesis and antithesis allowing us to 
                                                     
 
53 Jech p.115 
54 Kant (2007) p. 400 
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accept the possibility that the past as infinite and as a mathematical object subject to 
human experience through mathematical reason. The infinite limit of our enumeration 
allows for the mathematical object to exist transcendentally in this sense, while the 
recursive definition of the process to mediate an impression on our manifold of intuition 
of that mathematical object. This is a position which I believe is also supported by Ray H. 
Dotterer and Smith.  
Smith explicitly points out in Infinity and the Past that “the collection of events 
cannot add up to an infinite collection in a finite amount of time, but they do so add up in 
an infinite amount of time
55.” This is in line with my reasoning, because I believe it 
presupposes an infinite enumeration. Smith also suggests that an infinite number of 
events can be separated from the present by an infinite number of distances
56
. He clarifies 
this point by saying that “it is quite possible for there to be an infinite number of events 
that have really occurred such that each of the events is separated from the present event 
by a finite number of intermediate events
57.” This describes, in ordinary language, a 
recursive definition for the enumeration of past events from the present and thus supports 
an infinite, recursively definite, regressive synthesis.   
 Dotterer concludes, in The Definition of Infinity, that the notion of totality of the 
infinite, by any conception, “cannot be regarded as a something that is actually existing, 
but only as a scheme or plan that is in process of realization” and that this inexhaustible 
                                                     
 
55 Smith p. 72 
56 Smith p. 64 
57 Smith p. 64 
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series “is nevertheless a definite and thinkable unity58.”  Dotterer, in my assessment, is 
spot on. He does however highlight the commonly argued notion that one-to-one 
correspondences are problematic in infinite sets and because my argument tends to use of 
this method for comparing any two infinite series, it is necessary to address that concern. 
  
                                                     
 
58 Dotterer p. 300 
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Section 4 - Correspondence and Cardinality for Infinite Sets 
 
Briefly put, Dotter explains that one-to-one correspondences for infinite sets are 
problematic because when they are made it is not inconceivable to suggest that a many-
to-one correspondence is possible as well
59
. This is a problem outlined by E.R. Emmet in 
nearly identical terms. It is simpler to illustrate the problem with an example. We know 
that the even numbers can be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the odd. 
However, they can also be put into a two-to-one correspondence as well. Consider the 
following: 
Even  
Number 
Odd number in  
one-to-one correspondence 
Odd numbers in  
one-to-two correspondence 
2 1 1, 3 
4 3 5, 7 
6 5 7, 9 
8 7 11, 13 
… … … 
Table 3: Correspondence Breakdown 
 
The table above illustrates that in a one-to-one correspondence even and odd 
numbers are enumerated congruently. However, while in a one-to-two correspondence it 
could be suggested that even numbers outnumber odd by factor of two. Dotter suggests 
that we should elucidate the ambiguities of isomorphisms in order to understand that true 
nature of correspondence in terms of the infinite
60
. This suggests that a finite collection 
works fine with one-to-one correspondence, but that in an infinite setthese standards 
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break down
61
. I believe that the problem illustrated above is a misapplication of 
correspondence because the very fact that a one-to-one correspondence is possible is a 
stronger assertion for enumeration than any “larger” correspondence.  
To clarify, consider the aforementioned pairing activity. You have two infinite 
groups, both of which can be enumerated by the natural numbers. When comparing sets 
enumerated by the natural numbers, within ω, this problem disappears because these 
finite sets are predictable and exhaustible. For infinite sets, a recursive definition allows 
us to match case to case recursive instances from one set to another. In my assessment, 
the mere ability to compare infinite sets with cardinality equal or less than ω is enough to 
accept correspondence as an accurate measuring because their structures preserve the 
process of correspondence. While, it is true that a two-to-one or a one-to-two 
correspondence is possible, this is so only because each set is inexhaustible.   
 Ultimately, this problem is reconcilable because the existence of a “smallest” type 
of correspondence serves to represent the very least pair-wise organization of the 
elements of two sets. An illustrative analogy would be the difference between the height 
of a building and every height above it. We say that a building is x feet tall because the 
lowest measure that corresponds to the building’s height is x. We wouldn’t say that the 
building is x + y feet tall because there is a height taller than it. In the same way, I am 
suggesting that we wouldn’t say a one-to-one correspondence between two infinite sets 
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and a two-to-one correspondence is grounds to describe the cardinality of the set in terms 
of the latter correspondence.  
This topic is far too extensive to completely explore in this thesis, but for the sake 
of moving forward I will accept one-to-one correspondences as a justifiable means for 
measuring the size of sets because of the aforementioned, albeit informal, analysis. This 
means that we can reasonably compare Kant’s series of time in his thesis to his antithesis. 
However, as I stated earlier the nature of his antithesis is such that it seems compatible 
with an infinitely bounded series. Before I continue to that comparison, I first need to 
explain that inference.  
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Section 5 - Infinite Bounded Series 
 
 Instinctively, when we consider Kant’s antithesis on time, we conceive a bounded 
series with a beginning and an end. In this context it is described by its beginning and end 
as bounds. For simplicities sake, we will work exclusively with a closed bounded series. 
This means that all bounded series from here forward will include their beginning and 
ending elements
62
.  Kant suggests that this strictly ordered set is easily traversed because 
there is a start and the successive synthesis of moments in the series can be completed. 
This allows us to move from the beginning to the end of the series. However, there exists 
the same problematic inclusion of infinitude in the antithesis as there is in the thesis if we 
understand that an infinitely bounded set is compatible with the antithesis—a problem 
which is caused by the fact that Kant does nothing to address the natural density of 
moments.  
 To elucidate this problem, we must first understand that a bounded series can be 
exemplified in many ways.  We can consider Kant’s antithesis to be the most general 
example. But to break it down, consider the series of moments that existed from one 
minute ago to this moment. This example describes a series of moments within the set [-
1,0] along a timeline
63. Kant’s antithesis and [-1,0] each have a beginning, an end and 
would, by Kantian standards, be described as a traversable series. Secondly, we must 
understand the concept of density. Density, in mathematical terms, describes a series that 
has an element between any two other elements of itself
64
. For example, our bounded set 
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[-1,0] has as a member -0.5 minutes ago. It also has -0.75 minutes ago, -0.625 minutes 
ago, and so on. It is therefore necessarily conceivable for bounded series to be infinite 
when they are dense. Kant’s thesis and antithesis can be conceived using this framework. 
In mathematical terms, the densely bounded set [-n, 0] can represent time’s series as 
described in the antithesis, and the bounded set [-∞, 0] can represent time’s series as 
described in the thesis; both of which are infinite series
65
.   
 Now in terms of the argument Kant presents in his antithesis, we may wonder 
what consequences exist when we apply a densely bounded set of moments to it. I assert 
that it would then describe an infinite series that is not traversable in the same way Kant 
believes his thesis is not traversable. This is because a conception of the density of 
moments is isomorphic to the rational numbers, an infinitely countable set. Such an 
argument, in practical terms, consistently rounds irrational numbers into rational numbers 
with varying degrees of precision. I believe that demarcating moments in a dense way 
requires no more precision than this because we can make a moment’s enumeration 
number more precise by expanding its decimal notation. This also attributes uniqueness 
to these moments since they remain rigidly asymmetric as described earlier. Concerning 
ourselves with irrational numbers is neither helpful to our example nor to the conception 
of moments as dense. Furthermore, if we consider irrational numbers we gain little 
because each set becomes uncountable and the “traversing” of the two sets would persist 
as a legitimate problem. It is clear that I can traverse a moment ago to a moment now in 
spite of the density of those moments so, again, an irrational division of moments is 
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counter intuitive to the successive synthesis of time. Its uncountable nature precludes its 
application.  
Such a conception of time, wherein between any two moments there exists 
another moment, is comparable to the density of rational numbers. Rational numbers are 
dense in that between any two there is another rational number. Moments in time, in my 
assessment, behave similarly. Furthermore, considering Kant’s conception of the infinite, 
as to which nothing greater can be measured, does just as much justice to our conception 
of moments as it does to our enumeration of rational numbers. This is because we can 
construct the density of moments by taking the average of two moments in time to find 
the moment exactly half way between them and can do so indefinitely. Nothing will be 
greater in size than the series of dense moments in the antithesis nor can anything be 
greater in size than the infinite number of moments in the thesis. 
 This is a very powerful idea because what it ultimately indicates is that the 
number of moments between now and a minute ago is the same as now and five minutes 
ago or between any beginning of time and now; and this is a problem for Kant because he 
submits, in his thesis, that you can’t traverse an infinite series of moments. Thus, Kant’s 
methodology becomes inconsistent because the world with a beginning in time and a 
world without a beginning in time are isomorphic with each other and to the natural 
numbers. If he says we can’t traverse time in his thesis then we can’t traverse it in his 
antithesis.  
This means that in both arguments, you would need to traverse an infinite number 
of moments to reach the present moment. It could be suggested that Kant wouldn’t have 
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had access to the mathematical concept of density in sets; however, I would respond to 
such an argument by noting the density of moments is a product of common sense 
judgment even if it isn’t formalized.  Thus, it is easy to see that the problem of traversing 
an infinitely bounded set is as problematic in Kant’s own conception as traversing an 
infinite past to the present in an unbounded set. Thus, it makes more sense to consider the 
antithesis’s bounded set as a subset of the series of time described in his thesis than as an 
independent description of time allowing us to accept the possibility of an infinite past 
that is a priori accessible to mathematical reasoning. Furthermore, it is through 
mathematical conception that we can have any reasonable experience of the recursive 
definition of an infinite past as a possibility.  
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Section 6 - Conclusion 
 
 Ultimately, I believe Kant’s method in the antithesis and his description of 
infinity in the thesis does not contradict each other. If it did then a consistent use of 
“traversing an infinite set” would not be applicable to both the thesis and antithesis. 
Furthermore, from this conclusion it is reasonable to accept that a potential infinity 
transforms into a recursive definition from which we can have access to infinity as 
method. This method must allow for the traversing of an infinite series by a successive 
enumeration to an ever more continuous set of finite instances within a set of infinite 
cardinality for if it didn’t then no forward motion of time would be perceivable in Kant’s 
enterprise.  
To challenge this, one need only show that Kant’s conception of a bounded set of 
time cannot be dense, but I suspect that this is a herculean task, primarily because the 
idea that my experience of moments in time are “non-dense” is counter to the persistent 
existence of our intuitions. This scheme, best stated by Lawrence Friedman, is indicative 
of the very idea that the succession of moments is an uninterrupted continuum with each 
moment in relation, i.e. in a strictly ordered series, with another
66
.  There are no times 
when the possibility of a moment does not stand in relation between two other moments. 
 The comparable relation of moments to others is pivotal. Friedman continues by 
saying “in that which does the comparing, there must be a different series wherein the 
comparison takes place and ultimately some series must be compared in something which 
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is not at all a series or an extension, in order to avoid an infinite regress”67. This 
comparable notion of infinity as a mathematical object allows us to conceive a notion of 
an infinite regress as a recursively defined enumeration of past events which avoids 
logical contradiction. This atones reason of its contradiction because when we are 
“performing a synthesis of apprehension by representing a series” we do so in a unity, 
namely in a totality of the mathematical infinity as a mathematical object
68
. As Friedman 
concludes, we are then allowed to reasonably accept an infinite past as a special reference 
which is doing the grasping rather than referring to the grasped extension
69
.  
I believe it is important to put the previous statements in perspective. Infinity, in 
my view, is a mathematical object that saves us from the sensible infinite regress and 
focuses our attention on the regressive process. This is a challenge to Kant’s Antinomy 
on Time because it reconciles the antithesis’s method within the thesis’s conception of an 
infinite time. If any presupposition has been made throughout my enterprise, I would 
suggest that it is the acceptance of Kant’s premise that “no coming to be is possible from 
a time where everything is not
70
.” However, I don’t believe this handicaps my reasoning 
in any critical way. If anything, accepting this idea is required to traverse any strictly 
ordered series. You cannot move to the next member if there is no previous member. I 
would also suggest that such a premise supports the present moment because an infinite 
past would always support a successive moment. We can conclude then, that focusing on 
the process allows us to attain something sensible with which to view the relationship 
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between successive moments as comparable to an inexhaustible infinite, namely ω. In 
this light, the contradiction in Kant’s first antinomy is reconciled with a mathematical 
object. An object which helps us access the transcendental idea of infinity by means of 
pure reason alone and apply it to the present possibility of experience as it stands on some 
conception of the past as an infinite series of moments in some well-ordered framework; 
either bound or unbounded. 
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